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The Impact of Sociological Jurisprudence on
International Law in the Inter-War Period: The
American Experience
Samuel J. Astorino*
If only there were agreement on the meaning and function of
law, perhaps it then would be possible to build a world order
based on the obligations of law instead of force. If only there
were a realistic understanding of the inadequacies or impossibil-
ities of international law, perhaps it then would be possible to
build a stable world order based on a realistic political concept of
force.
These two visions of world order clashed dramatically in the
period between the two World Wars.1 The aim of this article is
to tell the story of how the jurisprudence of international law
came under increasing attack on two fronts in the inter-war
years. On one side, the jurisprudential underpinnings of the
subject was being criticized as an outdated formalistic positivism
that in its petrified form was simply incapable of responding
adequately to the political and social realities of the times. On
the other side, the realist approach arose from a conviction that
the very nature of international law was idealistic and impracti-
cal. This approach made significant headway to the point where,
by the late 1930's and early 1940's, it was generally understood
that orthodox international legal science had been discredited in
favor of some variation of individual or collective security.2 At
the heart of the matter were several nebulous and often conflict-
ing elements describing the jurisprudence, properly understood
as legal science, of international law. First, orthodox interpreta-
tions were premised on a belief that evolving case law, promul-
* Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, J.D. Duquesne University School of Law.
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. Douglas M. Johnston, Functionalism in the Theory of International Law, in
CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (C.B. Bourne et al. eds., 1988) (inter-
national law appears to be in a perpetual crisis).
2. Clyde Eagleton, Forces which will Shape the Rebuilding of International
Law, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 640, 642 (1942).
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gated in main by the Permanent Court of International Justice
and by the national courts, constituted all the necessary and
sufficient boundaries of international law. The law was thus
"posited."' International law in this structure derived its obliga-
tory force from such norms as secular natural law, morality,
inherent rightness of law, consent, and the natural obligation to
obey a nation's agreement, pacta sunt servanda. At its most
basic point was the understanding that law and force were anti-
thetical and, that in the long run, force could never form the
basis of a harmonious world. Even after American entry into
World War II, this position continued to be affirmed by orthodox
international lawyers. To this end, orthodox writings bristled
with condemnation of Austinian legal theory that had pro-
nounced the sterility of international law in the absence of the
command of a sovereign backed by sanctions.4
The philosophical attack on this jurisprudence emulated the
teachings of American Sociological Jurisprudence, as formulated
by Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo. Critics of the type of
legal science adhered to by orthodox international lawyers took
sustenance from the new legal philosophy of Sociological Juris-
prudence. Although primarily concerned with reforming Ameri-
can municipal law, the ideas of Pound and Cardozo, in particu-
lar, were gradually adopted by opponents of orthodoxy by the
mid-1920's and afterwards. The new legal vision insisted that,
as in consideration of municipal law, international law had be-
come mechanical and formalistic. The orthodox methodology of
international law created rules and then forced social realities to
either conform or fall aside from the rules. Sociological Jurispru-
dence preached that true legal science must be directed toward
the achievement of justice. This meant, most importantly, that
the results achieved by legal decisions trumped all other motiva-
tions behind a legal decision. In short, Sociological Jurispru-
dence, and what was being called "sociology of law,"5 provided
the ammunition used to attack the orthodox structure of inter-
national law at its philosophical roots.
The history of international law, however, involves much more
than a debate about the nature of legal science. As already not-
3. Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality,
History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779, 780 (1988).
4. For the traditional attack on Austin's views of international law, see AN-
THONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 23-24 (1971).
5. For an examination of the differences between sociology of law and Socio-
logical Jurisprudence in this time period, see Roscoe Pound, Sociology of Law and
Sociology of Jurisprudence, 5 U. TORONTO L. REv. 1, 1-20 (1943-1944).
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ed, efforts were made to compel international law to account for
social reality in the actual behavior of nations. Ultimately, "Re-
alism" emerged as the dominant view-a political balance of
power replaced liberalism's faith in the perfectibility of persons
or nations. While often articulated in faint terms in the inter-
war period by others, these two strands of legal science and
politics were incisively woven together in 1940 by Hans J.
Morgenthau. Keenly aware of the two American schools of legal
thought, Sociological Jurisprudence and American Legal Real-
ism, Morgenthau drew the substantive conclusion that orthodox
international law was barren as a legal science and largely use-
less in its substantive efforts to lay out an effective program of
world order. To Morgenthau, a plan to develop world order could
be accomplished only through a vision of political Realism in
foreign policy. Morgenthau, therefore, practiced as a Sociological
Jurisprude in the area of international relations.6
While this article primarily focuses on international law, one
of its additional purposes is to capture a forgotten aspect of
American legal history. In particular, this article examines the
impact that Sociological Jurisprudence and American Legal
Realism had beyond the dimensions of municipal law. Roscoe
Pound wrote sparingly about international law; Cardozo did not
write on this subject. Yet their philosophies of law, so closely
intertwined otherwise, helped to provoke a profound debate
about the nature of international law, the role of law in interna-
tional relations and how Americans should respond to the twen-
ty-year crisis bracketed by the two World Wars.7
The core teaching of orthodox international law immediately
before and after the First World War held that peace was the
norm. Realists, especially after the rise of fascism in the 1930's,
struck directly at this substantive conclusion with the argument
that the threat of counter-violence alone was the essential guar-
antor of peace. Also, according to Sociological Jurisprudence and
Realist doctrine, the failure of orthodox international law was its
6. As used throughout this paper the term "Realism" refers to the belief in a
political balance of power. The term "American Legal Realists" refers to the group of
American legal theorists, including such personages as Karl Llewellyn, Jerome
Frank, and Thurmond Arnold, who reached prominence by their efforts to modify
municipal law in the period 1930-1950.
7. The term "twenty-year crisis" belongs to E.H. Carr. See E.H. CARR, THE
TWENTY YEAR CRISIS 1919-1939 (2d ed. 1946). It must be strongly emphasized at the
outset that this article makes no effort to evaluate the competing visions of inter-
national law and relations discussed herein. There is no intent to take sides in the
great debate that has fascinated both academics and policymakers for the past cen-




adherence to an outworn philosophical methodology that refused
to adapt to the developing principles of the social sciences. The
dual thrusts created a crisis of legitimacy in international law.8
The central historical cause of this crisis was World War I.
World War I was viewed by all sides as an unequivocal moral
failure. The sides, however, differed in their analysis of the
war's causes. To the orthodox, the outbreak of war simply af-
firmed the absolute necessity of future adherence to law as the
alternative to war. To the critics of orthodoxy, the war signalled
the bankruptcy of toothless appeals to law; reality meant the
objective fact, as could be demonstrated by empirical social sci-
ence, of a balance of power politics.
Beginning in 1923, Manley 0. Hudson wrote an annual survey
of the Permanent Court of International Justice for the Ameri-
can Journal of International Law. In 1941, he began his review
with the observation that: "Events occurring during its nine-
teenth year created grave problems... and the Court survived
the year with uncertain prospects for the future."' The following
year Hudson noted that the "Permanent Court of International
Justice was not active during its twentieth year." ° For such an
eminent jurist and scholar in the field of international law,
these observations must have been personally devastating. Hud-
son had served as a judge on the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, was a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, a legal adviser to the Secretariat of the League of Nations,
and was the Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard.
No other single American could match his record of practice and
scholarly interest in the defense of the rule of law in world af-
fairs. Ironically, the two decades of his most important contribu-
tions coincided with the outbreak of the crisis of international
law.
To view this as a time of crisis may be somewhat of a seman-
tic over-indulgence. It has been suggested that there never was
8. The term "crisis of legitimacy" is commonly employed by American legal
historians to describe the problems facing American municipal law as a result of the
ideas set forth by the formalists in the late nineteenth century. See MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992). As noted later herein, the phrase is being purloined for the same
descriptive purpose of its traditional usage. Certainly by the late 1930's, it was un-
derstood that international law was undergoing a deadly challenge, perhaps unparal-
leled in its history. W. Friedman, The Disintegration of Western Civilization and the
Future of International Law, 2 MOD. L. REV. 194, 199-200 (1938).
9. Manley 0. Hudson, The Nineteenth Year of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1941).
10. Manley 0. Hudson, The Twentieth Year of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1942).
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a time when "international law was not in crisis!"" The theory
of international law, moreover, has been likened to "a bank of
fog on a still day."2 Whatever meanings have been attached to
the theory of international law, the object here is to describe the
particular impact that the social theory of law had on the for-
malist conception of international law in this time of crisis.
The formalist approach to international legal science was the
chief concern of post-World War I critics. The orthodox approach
to the theory of international law was first pronounced in Ameri-
can literature at the turn of the century by Lassa Oppenheim of
Cambridge University. 3 Oppenheim's work argued that if "nat-
ural law" is excluded from consideration altogether, the "method
to be applied by the science of international law can be no other
than positive law."" Oppenheim stated that:
The positive method is that applied by the science of law in general, and
it demands that whatever the aims and ends of a worker and researcher
may be, he must start from the existing recognized rules of international
law as they are to be found in the customary practice of the states or in
law making conventions.' 5
Oppenheim observed that, because times have changed, it was no
longer possible to follow Grotius and the natural law. 6 Further-
more, "case-law is of the greatest importance, for it brings into
view the practice of the courts of the individual states." 7 Ideal-
ism was the highest value aspired to by international lawyers.
Simultaneously, the "positive" method rejected the "ought," de-
fined as "rules which we wish to be in force." 18
Oppenheim believed that, in time, the thick development of
case law and treaties would lead ultimately to a world federal
law powerful enough to prevent states from going to war. Meth-
odologically, his legal science drew a sharp distinction between
facts that developed on the basis of existing recognized rules that
were formally written down and hypotheses based on what the
law "ought" to be. The latter should never have been confused
with law because it produced nothing but imaginary truths. In its
11. Johnston, supra note 1, at 3.
12. Id.
13. FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 n.
15 (1985).
14. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method,
2 AM. J. INTL L. 313, 333 (1908).
15. Oppenheim, supra note 14, at 333.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 339.
18. Id. at 355.
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classical form, positive law would progress on the basis of written
rules, hopefully attaining the perfection of a civilized code of
international law.'9 Law had to be separated from morals and
politics. Legal discourse was meant to be an apolitical, neutral
jurisprudence.
As critics would later cry out, this was a formal system of "law
in the books." It was a self-executing system of legal reasoning.
Law existed only in cases and treaties, and case law was the
product of juristic action interpreting the evolution of customary
law. Legal reasoning in this structure was self-contained and
self-perpetuating. Social reality, in terms of actual legal deci-
sions, was beyond consideration.
By the time Oppenheim penned his jurisprudence, the case-
book method was quickly becoming the acceptable form of teach-
ing international law. The publication in London of a collection of
cases by Pitt-Corbett in 1885 was not significantly used in the
United States. The first casebook of international law published
in America was written by Freeman Snow of Harvard and print-
ed in 1893. In his preface, Snow paid tribute to the "case system
introduced in the Harvard Law School a score of years ago by
Professor Langdell." ° In 1902, James Brown Scott issued a sec-
ond casebook that was to extend Snow's earlier work but it re-
sulted in a separate and distinct work.21 Scott's casebook domi-
nated the field for two decades. Lawrence B. Evans produced
another casebook in 1917. In that same year Ellery Stowell and
Henry F. Munro added another casebook to the literature. In the
meantime, the distinguished international lawyer, John Bassett
Moore, published his History and Digest of International Arbitra-
tion in 1898 and Digest of International Law in 1908.
Evaluating the growing use of the casebook method, Manley 0.
Hudson concluded that the "case-books greatly stimulated the
study of international law, particularly in the law schools, and
they improved the instruction within the colleges and in the law
schools." 2 While the case method was America's most original
contribution to modern legal education, it remained linked not
19. See BOYLE, supra note 13, at 313; Johnston, supra note 1, at 24-26.
20. FREEMAN SNOW, CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH NOTES
AND A SYLLABUS iii (1893).
21. See JAMES BROWN SCO'r, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED FROM
DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COURTS, WrTH SYLLABUS AND ANNOTATIONS
(1902). Snow's book and the first edition of Scott's book were published by the Bos-
ton Book Company. A second printing of Scott was done by West Publishing Compa-
ny in 1906, which was revised in 1922.
22. Manley 0. Hudson, The Teaching of International Law in America, 15 AM.
J. INTL L. 19, 21 (1929).
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only to law school pedagogy but to the very nature of legal sci-
ence. The case method and treaty legislation formed the two
pillars on which positivism rested. In effect, the casebook system
of legal education put into practice the belief that legal decision-
making could be self-executing and self-sufficient. That belief
also goes by other names, including "legalism," or "legal sufficien-
cy." It means that legal reasoning is conducted through the evo-
lution and analysis of case law but is hermetically sealed off from
any intrusion by extra-legal forces or considerations and most
certainly against notions of instrumentalist or result-oriented
jurisprudence. It is enough at this point to stress the fact that
from its own methodological origins, the case method followed the
conceptualism outlined by Langdellian legal philosophy. Positiv-
ism simply denies the relevance of reason and moral purpose
because they do not reveal timeless truths. Therefore, positivists
view law as a written body of rules having an independent and
self-contained structure that is both separate and distinct from
morality and history.23  In the final analysis, however,
Oppenheim's positivism adhered strictly to its idealistic faith that
international law simply existed as written law, that nations
were obligated to act in conformity with the rules of law, and
that international law was capable of directing a stable world
order. In true Langdellian fashion, any forward movement by the
law was to be accomplished by following precedent and by leap-
ing any gaps.
The idealistic vision was badly shaken by World War I. Even
the famous philosopher of American pragmatism, John Dewey,
noted an enormous decline in idealism and called for new ideas
to relate idealism and the "intelligent" use of force.24 In the af-
termath of the war, lawyers sought to implement the "new world
order" emerging from the Paris Peace Conference with the under-
standing that something had gone wrong with the orthodox
positivist vision of international legal science.25 Manley 0. Hud-
son observed that the war had caused a great crisis in interna-
tional law, entailing a loss of faith in its principles. Hudson rue-
fully stated that a general sense of skepticism pervaded the field,
even to the extent of revisiting the Austinian argument as to the
"existence of a law of nations which might properly be called law."26
23.' Berman, supra note 3, at 780.
24. John Dewey, The Discrediting of Idealism, 20 NEW REPUBLIC 285, 285-87
(Oct. 8, 1919).
25. See, e.g., FREDERICK C. HICKS, THE NEW WORLD ORDER: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1920).
26. Manley 0. Hudson, The Development of International Law Since the War,
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For the next two decades, the philosophical structure of inter-
national legal science was divided between defenders of orthodox
positivism and critics who increasingly drew intellectual inspira-
tion from the new sociological approach to jurisprudence that had
become the rage of the new lawyers in American municipal law.
It was obvious, by any measure, that the debate mirrored the
precise conflict between formalist and sociological law that ran
across the municipal legal landscape both in America and in
Europe.
The orthodoxy of positivism continued to call forth spirited
defenders in the inter-war period. In 1919, in his address to the
American Bar Association, David J. Hill cautioned his listeners
to avoid being drawn to the side of force.27 John Dewey support-
ed the creation of a code of international law that he believed
would stop lawlessness. Dewey's views were a direct rejection of
Walter Lippmann's dire prediction that such a code would create
a super-government.28 The codification movement traced its ori-
gins back to the middle of the nineteenth century in both Europe
and America but witnessed its most significant advance in the
work of the Institute of International Law at the Hague. Its
American counterpart was the American Institute of Internation-
al Law that worked diligently in the inter-war period to provide a
code. James Brown Scott hailed both bodies for providing the
certain road to justice "which, expressed in rules of law, form a
safe and secure guide for nations in their mutual intercourse."29
The president of Columbia University, Nicolas Murray Butler,
further insisted that individual morality and a nation's morality
were identical in the sense of being bound to conform to the
law.3
0
Phillip C. Jessup and John Basset Moore, both jurists and
international lawyers at Columbia University, also staunchly
22 AM. J. INT'L L. 330, 331 (1928).
27. David Jayne Hill, The Nations and the Law, 210 N. AM. REV. 439, 440-41
(Oct. 1919).
28. John Dewey, War and a Code of Law, 36 NEw REPUBLIC 224, 224-26 (Oct.
24, 1923). For Dewey's view of law as being a restraint and result-oriented, see
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 26-27 (1924).
29. James Brown Scott, The Codification of International Law, 18 AM J. INT'L
L. 260, 260 (1924). Scott's credentials as a positivist in this field were established by
his article, John Brown Scott, The Legal Nature of International Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L
L. 831 (1907).
30. Nicholas Murray Butler, Development of an International Mind, 9 A.B.A.J.
520, 521 (1923). As late as 1940, Butler, who was also the head of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, called for a new world order based on "liber-
alism," a term that was associated with the ideal of the rule of law rather than
force. Blaze Peace Path Butler Urges U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1940, at L16.
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defended orthodoxy. Jessup originally complained bitterly in 1937
t]hat there is not inconsiderable lay opinion-shared, unfortu-
nately, by some members of the bar-that international law ex-
ists only in books."31 In fact, he concluded, international law "is
enough of a reality."3 ' Three years later, he wrote that "unin-
formed lay opinion... denies the existence of international
law."33 Jessup's book entitled International Law and Some Cur-
rent Illusions, published in 1924, however, was a traditional
exercise in the application of existing rules to various problems.
By 1933, this judge of the Permanent Court of International
Justice condemned the "new thought" that was "daily manifest-
ed ... at conventions, lectures, dinners, and other public gather-
ings" and declared that "we must break with the past."" He
concluded that: 'What the world most needs today is a return to
law, and to the orderly modes of action which the observance of
law assures."" Positivism was further advanced by the writings
of others, most notably Sir Hersh Lauterpacht and Hans
Kelsen."6
The work of Manley 0. Hudson deserves special consideration.
While he was a devoted defender of the rule of law in interna-
tional affairs, he may have been the first major figure in the field
to call for a revision of the philosophical basis of international
legal science. He, too, had suffered intellectually from the shock
of 1914 and well understood the dismay of his colleagues in the
early 1920's. By 1923, however, he felt more hopeful, noting the
strides made by the League of Nations, arbitration conferences
and what he termed a "new habit of mind" striving toward the
pacific settlement of disputes.37 In 1925, nevertheless, he twice
31. Philip C. Jessup, The Spanish Rebellion in International Law, 15 FOREIGN
AFF. 260, 262 (Jan. 1937).
32. Jessup, supra note 31, at 262.
33. Philip C. Jessup, The Reality of International Law, 18 FOREIGN AFF. 244,
253 (Jan. 1940). See Philip C. Jessup, In Support of International Law, 34 AM. J.
INT'L L. 505, 505 (1940).
34. John Bassett Moore, The New Isolation, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 628
(1933).
35. Moore, supra note 34, at 629. See also John Bassett Moore, An Appeal to
Reason, 11 FOREIGN AFF. 547 (July 1933); John Bassett Moore, Post-War Interna-
tional Law, 27 COLuM. L. REV. 400 (1927).
36. See HERSH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CoMMUNITy (1933). Kelsen and the theories of the "Vienna School" were introduced
to American readers by such articles as Josef L. Kunz, The Vienna School of Inter-
national Law, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. 370 (1934). Kunz had been a student of Kelsen's in
Vienna. Like many other European scholars, he had fled to America where he
taught at the University of Toledo and spread Kelsen's stark positivism to American
students.
37. Hudson, supra note 26, at 341.
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announced that international legal science required new think-
ing. His first article, appearing in February of that year, boldly
stated that it was time, in this quest for codification, for "new
foundations" to be laid. Twentieth century changes mandated
that international law go beyond Grotius in building a world soci-
ety. Hudson reasoned that: "We must construct not merely a
body of law, but also a legal philosophy that will give it vitality
and power for growth.""5 In June he published his lectures at
the Cornell Law School celebrating the ter-Centenary of Grotius.
There he reiterated his argument that the foundations of the law,
its aims and philosophical roots must be re-examined. 9 Con-
demning the sterility of nineteenth century ideas that merely
studied what was handed down, he pointedly continued:
It must be the aspiration of our twentieth century to make the statement
that our law of nations conform to the facts of our present-day world, and
we may have to admit that there is yet no law of nations by which all
nations are bound."0
But in modern times, our international law has been too largely a field
by itself. In spite of the frequent borrowing of analogies, it has lagged
behind the evolution of municipal law, especially in America. It is not
surprising therefore that so little draught has been made on other social
sciences. But the future law of nations must seek contributions from
history, from political science, from economics, from sociology and social
psychology if it would keep pace with the society which it serves; and a
sound philosophical basis for the international law of the twentieth cen-
tury can only result from a "functional critique of international law in
terms of social ends."4 '
Progress will be made when we begin to free ourselves from the "tyranny
of phrases.". . . We must know the ends that our law is to serve before
we can hope to make it serve them. '2
Special emphasis should be placed on the fact that Hudson
cited to the work of Roscoe Pound, his dean at Harvard and the
most significant exponent of a new legal philosophy known as
"Sociological Jurisprudence." Hudson thereby forged a crucial
link between international law and the sociological nature of
municipal law. His critique was almost a plagiarized embodiment
of Pound's assault on Langdellian conceptualism. Subsequently
cited by others who came to identical conclusions about the na-
ture of international jurisprudence, Hudson's Cornell article
38. Manley 0. Hudson, The Outlook for the Development of International Law,
11 A.B.J.A. 102, 107 (1925).
39. See Manley 0. Hudson, The Prospect for International Law in the Twen-
tieth Century, 10 CoRNELL L.Q. 419, 422-23 (1925).
40. Hudson, supra note 39, at 427.
41. Id. at 434-35 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 435-36.
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extended, with precision, the reach of Sociological Jurisprudence
to international law in this period. He seemed to recognize that
even though international law appeared to be a separate aspect
of legal science because of its peculiar problems, especially in
respect to the use of force, it was still tightly linked to general
jurisprudence.
The lesson to be learned from Pound in the area of internation-
al law was that the new thinking of the twentieth century had to
mount a revolt against the nineteenth century formalism. The
Pound article cited by Hudson was the most compelling and rare
instance where Pound, now in 1923, had turned his attention to
international law and found it to be woefully lacking in intellec-
tual vigor as was the legal science of Langdell.'
Ever the master legal historian in America, Pound's essay
surveyed the history of legal thought up to the twentieth century
and mounted a grueling analysis of positivism in international
law:
Positivist international lawyers sought to find by observation laws of
development of an ordering of international relations, to verify these laws
by historical and analytical investigation and to deduce their logical
consequences in the form of legal rules. These laws of international de-
velopment were conceived in various ways, as mechanical-physical, or
biological, or perhaps economic. At any rate the positivist also would
have nothing to do with consideration of what ought to be.... Positivist
jurisprudence, in its first or mechanical stage, adopted this mode of
thinking, substituting an idea of the mechanical operation of laws of
progress or development for the Hegelian unfolding of the idea.... At-
tempts to make legal institutions or to make law were as futile as at-
tempts to bring rain by means of sorcery. The nineteenth-century me-
chanical positivist had as little respect for the one as for the other."
Looking back, then, it is not hard to see why the nineteenth-century
achieved so little in international law.... They did not seek to be active
agents in legal development. They expected legal development to operate
itself from some internal momentum. The jurist was able to follow, ar-
ranging and ordering and systematizing or observing and verifying and
thus discovering the foreordained lines of growth."
Pound further insisted that international law had no plan for
making new law or for adapting old materials to new situations.
Pound argued that: "The conception of a slow and internally
ordered succession of events and of institution, whereby things
perfect themselves in evolving to be the limit of their idea has
43. Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, I BIBLIOTECA
VISSERIANA 73, 73-90 (1923) (consisting of his lecture at the University of Leiden).
44. Pound, supra note 43, at 87.




The cure could be found in "new philosophies of action" given
to "social engineering" that took into account social psychology,
sociology, economics, as well as law and politics. 47 The "juristic
romance" which created "the cosmological romance of some closed
metaphysical system" were to be subjected to a functional cri-
tique of international law in terms of social ends. Pound conclud-
ed that "legal organs must be understood 'as a process' and not
'as a condition. '" "
For Pound, the established formalism of international law was
the same legalistic enemy that he fought for nearly two decades
in the domestic legal arena. His target continued to be the influ-
ence of Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of the Harvard
Law School in the years 1870 to 1895, and author of the casebook
method. To Langdell, law was a science that should use the sci-
entific method to fashion correct legal judgments from relatively
few fundamental principles and concepts. His legal theory
stressed the "inside" view of law as opposed to an "outside" view
derived from the social sciences. The dichotomy corresponded to
Pound's juxtaposition of law "in the books" and "law in action."
Legal rules, according to Langdell, derived from abstract princi-
ples. Such rules were complete within themselves and self-exe-
cuting. They provided a vision of a "rule of law" that implied the
notion of a "government of laws, not of men." Central to the
Langdellian system was the casebook method that instilled in
students and jurists the belief that only cases mattered in the
decision-making process. Law, therefore, was rule-bound, sealed
against extra-legal considerations. 9 Among today's legal histo-
rians, Langdellianism is known variously as orthodoxy, deductive
logic, conceptualism, classical legal thought, and formalism."
Langdellian formalism drew the wrath of such critics as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo. Langdell's
legal science, in their view, created a crisis of legitimacy in law
46. Id. at 89.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The standard work on Langdell is Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45
U. PIr. L. REV. 1 (1983). See also WILLIAM P. LA PIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE:
THE ORIGINS OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994). Cf. Maria Speziale, Langdell's
Concept of Legal Science: The Beginnings of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theo-
ry, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980).
50. The voluminous bibliography on this subject is found in AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM 319-326 (William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993) and in HORWITZ, supra note
8. The term "formalism" comes from MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA:
THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949). See also E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
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by failing to respond to the phenomenal problems raised by the
Industrial Revolution. Holmes set forth the famous maxim that
"the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience,"
and Pound's academic casting of "law in books" versus "law in ac-
tion" carried the identical distinction."' Pound used other epi-
thets, foremost among them was the term "mechanical jurispru-
dence." 2 To Pound, the chasm between the two versions of legal
science could be resolved by consequentialist and functionalist
theory carried into practice through the mechanism of social
engineering. Mechanical jurisprudence was wrong because it
would not account for results. It was unrealistic because it was
out of touch with the way things were in actuality.
Cardozo's frontal assault on fornalist legal science appeared in
1921 in his book, The Nature of the Judicial Process. Tracking
Pound closely, Cardozo saw that "the demon of formalism tempts
the intellect with the lure of scientific order."53 Sociological Ju-
risprudence, by contrast, meant that the "power of social jus-
tice ... finds its outlet and expression in the method of sociolo-
gy.",54 Rules were malleable. Common law was pragmatic and its
truth was relative, not absolute.55 The purpose of law was the
end result, the goal, and not the origin. A judge was to act as a
legislator.5"
By the middle of the 1920's, therefore, the legalistic system of
both municipal and international law was being tested in the
most profound sense by the new wave of social science. John
Dewey's pragmatism attacked philosophical idealism by concen-
trating on consequentialist and functionalist truth. Coupled to
the work of Felix Cohen, it could now be demonstrated that the
deductive logic of formalism could not provide a self-executing
method of argument from the general to the particular. 7
Pound's study of Grotius, furthermore, convinced him that while
previous philosophical systems worked well for their times, the
better methods leading to progress rested with newer sciences.
Legal scientists "must turn to rational speculation, as distin-
51. HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 4, 33, 187-88.
52. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
53. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921)
[hereinafter THE JUDICIAL PROCESS]. See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF
THE LAW (1924).
54. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 53, at 66-78.
55. Id. at 102.
56. Id. at 98-141.
57. See Felix Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L.
REV. 5 (1937). Cohen stated that: "If you want to understand something, observe it
in action." Id. at 8.
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guished from the apocryphal 'reasons' of the nadir of
philosophical jurisprudence and the formal logic of the jurispru-
dence of conceptions." 8
Hudson's writings in 1925 had thereby sought to entice inter-
national lawyers across the river to the new land of Sociological
Jurisprudence. As noted earlier, the strength of orthodoxy in
international legal science came to be impaired but was certainly
not overthrown. International legal science was no more defeated
than Langdellianism.59 In the decades between the wars, howev-
er, the demands that international law conform its philosophical
basis to the dictates of social science became a common feature of
the literature as written by both international lawyers and po-
litical scientists. In a much broader sense, the air was being
filled by studies devoted to the sociology and anthropology of
law."0
As the remnants of peace were being chewed away by the rise
of fascism in the 1930's, international law, in fact, was accused
outright of being irrelevant.6' The Harvard political scientist,
Payton S. Wild, concluded that: "International law may be a neat
little science within itself, but if it fails to be of service in guiding
the policies of states in matters of grave moment, the interna-
tional lawyer cannot but be alarmed for his study."2 Wild ar-
gued that international law should look to "politics and policies,"
to what "is" done and what "ought" to be done.' Writing for an
American audience, the English commentators W. Friedman and
Georg Schwartzenberg believed that international society could
not be built upon customary international law and that, in order
58. Roscoe Pound, Grotius and the Science of Law, 19 AM. J. INTIL L. 685, 688
(1925). Pound's earlier analysis of Grotius as a legal thinker appeared in Roscoe
Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 27 HARV. L. REV. 605,
616-19 (1914), which made no reference to the theory of international law.
59. The question of whether formalism has ever been buried in municipal legal
thought is still a subject of debate among American legal historians. See Joseph W.
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988).
60. See Pittman Potter, Political Science in the International Field, 17 AM. PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE REV. 381, 381-91 (.1923); Edwin D. Dickinson, The New Law of Na-
tions, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 4, 20 (1925-1926) (sociological law sought "the ideal from the
world of realities as a starting point instead of constructing air castles first and
trying to persuade the world to move in afterwards."). See also ALFRED BALD AND
WILLIAM S. A. Porr, THE BASICs OF SOCIAL THEORY (1924); N.S. TIMASHEFF, THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1940). The anthropologist Branislaw Malinowski reviewed The
Cheyenne Way by Karl Lewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel from the perspective of the
growth of law in Branislaw Malinowski, Book Note, 35 AM. J. IN'L L. 1237 (1941-
1942).
61. BOYLE, supra note 13, at 12.
62. Payton S. Wild, What is the Trouble with International Law?, 32 AM. PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE REV. 478, 479 (1938).
63. Wild, supra note 62, at 492.
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to avoid sterility, legal research in this field was required to
relate to "the wider issue of social life."
64
Efforts to link the science of international law and sociological
jurisprudence were successful in at least two prominent books,
both of which were published when the Second World War was
underway in America. The first, and most sophisticated, was Law
Without Force: The Function of Politics in International Law,
published in 1941 by the Princeton political scientist, Gerhart
Niemeyer. Niemeyer argued "that an obsolete and inadequate
way of thinking is just as disastrous to the possibility of estab-
lishing order in the real world as is war or rebellion."" He fur-
ther stated that: "It is not merely a theoretical issue. "'
Niemeyer's work, which cited to Roscoe Pound and Cardozo,
proposed to set international law within the parameters of a
"functionalism" based on "coordinate behavior" or "inter-
connectedness." 7 Niemeyer, in short, theorized that all rules of
law, emanating from social behavior, must be "commonly directed
towards specific ends."' This idea was clearly borrowed from
Cardozo. According to Niemeyer, the problem with the past inter-
national jurisprudence was that it emphasized the "individual in
existence" rather than the individual "in action," or the "Man
Coordinate." As with Sociological Jurisprudence, international
jurisprudence must look first to the results of its decisions. Ironi-
cally, in the context of the time in which he wrote, Niemeyer's
lengthy and complex analysis rejected the use of force and spirit-
edly defended international law as the best hope for peace. The
fatal flaw of the League of Nations was its ultimate reliance on
force. When based on a proper philosophical foundation, interna-
tional law would be able to command an "inhererit rightness"
that would bind all nations to its rules."9
A second major effort to couple the general sociology of law
with American legal theorists appeared in 1942. Georges
64. Id. at 479. See W. Friedman, The Disintegration of European Civilization
and the Future Civilization and the Future International Law, 2 MOD. L. REv. 194,
214 (1938); Georg Schwartzenberg, The Rule of Law and the Disintegration of Inter-
national Society, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 58 n.12 (1939).
65. GERHART NIEMEYER, LAW WITHOUT FORCE: THE FUNCTION OF POLITICS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 18 (1941).
66. NIEMEYER, supra note 65, at 19.
67. Id. at 254-58.
68. Id. at 271.
69. Id. at 18-24, 249, 254-58, 265, 271. The citations to Pound and Cardozo
should not be misleading. While Niemeyer understood their contributions in forcing a
link between international law and the social sciences, he criticized both for their
adherence to an atomistic conception of society rather than on coordinate human be-
havior. Niemeyer's reliance on Pound, however, was both scanty and misplaced.
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Gurvitch, in The Sociology of Law, examined the Continental
scholarship of Emile Durkheim, Eugen Ehrlich, and Max Weber
as well as Holmes, Cardozo, Pound and American Legal Realists
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and Thurmond Arnold. Whatever
differences existed between and among these writers, there was a
basic agreement that all law, including the international branch,
had to employ the methods of social science in order to be truth-
fu1.
7 0
Pound wrote the introduction to Gurvitch's book. He discussed
the several different views concerning the distinctive meanings of
"sociological jurisprudence" and "sociology of law" but emphasized
their common philosophy and method. The following year, Pound
sharpened the distinctions in meaning and once again insisted
that: "Law in all its senses is studied as a much specialized
phase of what in a larger view is a science of society."7 ' Legal
institutions and doctrines, always subject to improvement "by
reference to their ends by conscious, intelligent effort, are, in fact,
forms of "social control."72
The demand that orthodox international legal science trans-
form itself into a functional, result-oriented approach, therefore,
was in full sway by the time World War II began. It appears that
the reputation of international law fell in direct proportion to the
rise of the sociological viewpoint. While it is equally true that
this viewpoint issued forth from diverse sources often in conflict
because of nuanced intellectual details, and may even have been
cacophonous, it seemed obvious by this time that a great many
voices were ganging up on the idealistic disciples of Oppenheim.
Surely the most incisive, brilliant, and provocative of these
voices was Hans J. Morgenthau who, by roughly 1940, emerged
as the enfant terrible of the study of international relations.
Morgenthau made, in form and substance, the most formidable
argument for the use of power in foreign policy. In the process,
70. Although it can be said that American Legal Realists carried forth the
ideas of the Sociological Jurisprudes, the two groups had developed serious differenc-
es. The former, especially under Llewellyn's guidance, sought to reduce law to a
value-free scientific methodology. Pound and Cardozo, on the other hand, underscored
a relationship between law and morals. Where the Sociological Jurisprudes were
certain about values, Llewellyn and Frank were nihilists.
Their conflict, although not within the scope of this paper, drew little notice
from international lawyers. Niemeyer rejected the approach of the Realists on the
grounds that they were more concerned with a realistic knowledge about the practi-
cal question of how legal suits are decided rather than with the problem of where to
find, measure, and evaluate the criteria of such decisions. NIEMEYER, supra note 65,
at 257 n.22.




and relying heavily on the ideas of such American legal scientists
as Pound, Cardozo, Cohen, and Llewellyn, he became the central
nemesis of orthodox international law.
Educated in Germany in law and political science, and fluent
in French and English, Morgenthau was part of a wave of refu-
gee-scholars who emigrated to America just ahead of their Nazi
pursuers.7" In accordance with the messages of Pound and
Llewellyn, his writings during this time period persistently ad-
vanced the theme that the philosophical bases of international
legal science in America had been largely illusory; that interna-
tional law failed substantively in its goal of preventing war and
that a stable international system can be founded substantively
only on a balance of power among nations. In this sense,
Morgenthau's singular achievement lay in combining an attack
on the jurisprudence of international law with the substantive
conclusion that power politics constituted the necessary frame-
work of all diplomacy; hence, the validity of Realism.
Speaking of what was left of neutrality in 1938, Morgenthau
wrote that:
The rules of international law referring to the rights and obligations of
neutrals have no independent normative existence of their own; they are
only the expression of certain legal, economic, political, and military
conditions to which they owe their existence. Should these conditions
change, these rules change also; should these conditions cease to exist,
these rules cease to exist. Only this legal sociological background can
provide a scientific understanding of the legal value and practical impor-
73. A biographical sketch of Morgenthau is in BOYLE, supra note 13, at 11
n.11. Morgenthau was admitted to the Kansas Bar. The profound influence of Euro-
pean scholarship was evident before 1930. This fascinating connection was promi-
nently featured in the writings of American legal theorists, especially in the writings
of Pound. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 618-19 (1911) (tracing the current thought of new
German lawyers and sociologists). Pound, like other American legal reformers, drew
heavily on the work of German scholars, such as Eugen Ehrlich and Rudolf Jhering
of Gettingen who rejected Pandektenwissenschaft because of its excessive generaliza-
tion and obstruction. Roscoe Pound, An Appreciation of Eugen Ehrlich, 36 HARV. L.
REv. 129, 130 (1922) (Ehrlich had been barred from visiting the United States in
1914.). Although Karl LIewellyn advised his friends to avoid referencing German
sources in the 1930's because such reference could be the "kiss of death," he re-
mained the closest link with German legal scientists. No pretense is made in this
paper to explore that general linkage and influence. See THE RECEPTION OF CONTI-
NENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD (Mathias Reiman ed. 1993) (published in
Berlin) (articles by German scholars). An important survey of the influence of Euro-
pean sociological jurisprudence on international law is Hans J. Morgenthau, The
Problem of Neutrality, 7 U.K.C. L. REV. 109 (1939). The standard work on the refu-
gee-scholars in America is H. STUART HUGHES, THE SEA CHANGE: THE MIGRATION OF
SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1930-1965 (1975).
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tance of the rules of neutrality in a changing international order.74
The science of international law has always laid strong emphasis on ab-
solute concepts, theoretical generalizations, and systematic constructions
which would scarcely stand the test of the real law of nations."5
The following year, Morgenthau declared that parts of the
Covenant of the League of Nations were "a dead letter."76 The
"moral and political philosophy which had been the foundation of
international law is no longer recognized by the great nations."77
It was "swept away by totalitarian conduct.""
Morgenthau's theoretical work in America, which tied together
law and the new concepts of sociology, left no doubt as to its
reliance on Cardozo and Pound. Traditional legal research, he
argued, was concerned exclusively with the contents of legal
rules. This approach asked "[wihat is the rule of law to be ap-
plied in this case? and lets it go at that."79 It was the orthodox
belief that the mere text of the legal rule provided all the knowl-
edge required to solve the problem. Pound and Cardozo correctly
rejected this as "legalistic," "dogmatic," or "positivist."
Morgenthau argued that the new vision could be derived from
the model of the Brandeis Brief submitted in the famous case of
Muller v. Oregon"0 that supplemented the text of law with pre-
legal and post-legal factors.8
Morgenthau's most provocative and mature attack on interna-
tional legal science, however, was made in his well-known article,
Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law." Once again
his research was heavily dosed with references to Pound,
Llewellyn, Louis Brandeis, and Continental scholarship.
Morgenthau stated that: "Juridic positivism starts with the as-
sumption that its subject-matter is to be found exclusively in the
written law of the state."3 He observed that: "Positivism trans-
planted schematically the highly refined positivist method of
formalism and conceptualist interpretation into the domain of
74. Morgenthau, supra note 73, at 109 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 110 (footnote omitted).
76. Hans J. Morgenthau, The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe, 33 AM.
POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 473, 473 (1939).
77. Morgenthau, supra note 76, at 483.
78. Id. at 483-84.
79. Hans J. Morgenthau, Sociology of Law, 9 U.K.C. L. REv. 61, 62 (1940-
1941).
80. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
81. Morgenthau, supra note 79, at 62.
82. Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34
AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940).
83. Morgenthau, supra note 82, at 265.
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international law."8 The "positive" law accepted rules as they
were, without passing judgment on ethical values or practical
application." Positivism, moreover, separated law from ethics,
psychology and sociology. s6  Sociological Jurisprudence and
American Legal Realism destroyed the barriers between extra-
legal considerations and the law. Where positivism had reigned
almost unchallenged in Germany and Italy, totalitarianism killed
it as "a manifestation of liberalistic decadence," and "positivism is
no longer a guiding influence in modern legal thought.""1 "Law
and nothing but the law," he wrote, was now a hollow slogan.88
For present purposes, it is critical to note Morgenthau's state-
ment that the "helplessness" of international law, "its sincere
self-deception," resulted from the very "assumptions and methods
which have led juridic positivism to defeat in the domestic
field."s9
Orthodoxy had to be replaced by a "functional theory of inter-
national relations."' Functional jurisprudence according to
Morgenthau, was formulated by Pound, Llewellyn, Felix Cohen
and others. "The direction of sociology" would lead to the study of
law in the context of social science rather than reliance on the
exclusive consideration of legal materials.9 '
In 1942, the Grotius Society in London, organized in 1915,
passed a resolution proclaiming that: "Without enforcement by
appropriate organs, international law will continue to be defied
with impunity."92 When the American Society of International
Law met in Washington, D.C. in April of that year, Charles G.
Fenwick of the board of editors of the Journal and professor at
Bryn Mawr College, submitted a response: "The law of force must
be repudiated."93 The editorial comment in the Journal's next
issue bristled with the debate between the orthodox and the new
Realism.94 Edwin Borchard rejected the concept of "collective
security": "war, in most cases, is not an international crime but a
84. Id. at 272.
85. Id. at 261.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 263.
88. Morgenthau, supra note 82, at 263.
89. Id. at 265.
90. Id. at 273-84.
91. Id. at 274 n-43.
92. Quincy Wright, The Future of International Law, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 451,
451 (1942).
93. Charles G. Fenwick, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 36
AM. J. INT'L L. 446, 446 (1942).
94. Wright, supra note 92, at 451. For whatever reason, these comments made
no reference to Morgenthau's writings.
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social disease" to be cured by "economic and social physicians"
rather than "political theologians."95 Herbert W. Briggs, also an
editor, cited Hudson's Cornell article of 1925 when he called for
more "scientific study of what states actually do." 6 Clyde
Eagleton of New York University urged that international legal
science study technical, social and economic conditions. Eagleton
stated: "Nor is it possible to prevent war by mere fiat, by the
legal phraseology of a treaty. Words alone can not do it; the law
must have behind it a physical strength sufficient to stop the
war-maker." 7
It was left for Philip Marshall Brown to defend the existence of
international law while mounting a bitter assault on the tradi-
tionalists: "[L]ike monks... [they] are more interested in theo-
ries and abstract speculation.. . . Like Byzantine logothetes,
they have fenced over fine legal distinctions."' The use of the
casebook method indicated that "the student emerges with little
more than an encyclopedic knowledge of cases and precedents.
He has gained no real knowledge of the true nature of the law of
nations."9 Brown concluded that there "is an immense need of
what Roscoe Pound has well termed the 'engineering attitude' of
approach to new problems."
10 °
By this time, Realism seemed to be winning the day. Nicholas
Spykman and Walter Lippmann pushed forward their visions of
power politics.1"' Albert Einstein predicted that the League of
Nations would be re-created as an armed league to enforce peace,
because a military counter balance to Hitler was required at this
moment. 102
As hostilities came to an end in 1945, Morgenthau published
his book, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, which compiled war-
time lectures given at the New School for Social Research. Badly
shaken by the fall of France in 1940, Morgenthau turned his
95. Edwin Borchard, The Place of Force in International Law, 36 AM. J. INTL
L. 628, 631 (1942).
96. Herbert W. Briggs, Re-Examination of International Law, 36 AM. J. INTL
L. 637, 639 (1942).
97. Clyde Eagleton, Forces which will Shape the Rebuilding of International
Law, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 640, 642 (1942).
98. Philip Marshall Brown, The Renovation of International Law, 36 AM. J.
INT'L L. 631, 631 (1942).
99. Brown, supra note 98, at 634.
100. Id. at 636.
101. See NicHILAs J. SPYKMAN, AMERICA'S STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS: THE
UNITED STATES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER (1942); WALTER LIPPMAN, FOREIGN
POLICY: SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC (1943).
102. See Einstein Predicts An Armed League, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1940, at 16;
OTTO NATHAN AND HEINZ NORDEN, EINSTEIN ON PEACE 246 (1960).
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wrath to the fallacies of liberalism and idealistic philosophical
rationalism and criticized the belief in the perfectibility of human
conduct. The age of reason, progress and peace had been shat-
tered by fascism. Human nature admittedly was rational in part,
but it also was biological and spiritual. Morgenthau stated: "This
re-examination must start with the assumption that power poli-
tics, rooted in the lust for power which is common to all men, is
for this reason inseparable from social life itself."'0 3 The illusion
of perfectibility was tragically applied to the international field
where, as Pound had cautioned, it ended up in an "orgy of ideal-
ism and extravagant faith in the perfectibility to be brought
about by law.""' The illusion was that: "Liberal philosophy and
practice sees in the judicial process the ideal method of settling
international disputes."0 5 Morgenthau concluded:
Thus an age which seems to be unable to meet the intellectual and moral
challenge of true statesmanship or to face in time the cruel alternative to
its political failure takes refuge in illusions: the illusion of international
law as a standard for political action, the illusion of a naturally harmoni-
ous social world, the illusion of a social science imitating a model of the
natural sciences which the modern natural sciences themselves no longer
accept. 1"6
The study of international law as envisioned by Lassa
Oppenheim thus had been called into question in a most pro-
found sense. Oppenheim sent out a call to idealists to structure
an international law able to induce a stable world order. At the
opposite pole in time stood Morgenthau, the foe of idealism and
champion of power politics. The time continuum between
Oppenheim and Morgenthau had been factually marked by two
unparalleled wars against world civilization and intellectually
wrenched by the impact of social science in all fields of human
knowledge, including the study of general jurisprudence. Formal-
ist international law in America could not have escaped the in-
fluence of Pound and Llewellyn any more than municipal law. It
remained problematic to unify jurisprudence and social sci-
ence.' 7 This, however, was not the message of sociological legal
culture in the inter-war years. During the inter-war period, it
was the standard intellectual fashion to take social science at its
word.
103. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITCS 9 (1946).
104. MORGENTHAU, supra note 103, at 111.
105. Id. at 108.
106. Id. at 121.
107. JuLUs STONE, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE SECOND HALF CEN-
TURY 48-49 (1966).
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In the final analysis, it is important to note that, as interna-
tional law, with its court, arbitration devices, and written law,
clearly continues to exert great authority in world affairs, human
beings continue to slaughter one another. In practical terms,
Sociological Jurisprudence and American Legal Realism in the
period between the wars could not suggest or build a prototype of
action to be followed in either the municipal or international
fields of legal science. The purpose of this article has been to
suggest a story of how competing theories of law clashed at a
moment in time in the fervent hope that further historical re-
search can help to point the way to a better future.
